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RULE 15a-6 AND BEYOND: ARE U.S. RULES FOR NON-
U.S. BROKER-DEALERS WORKABLE IN TODAY'S 
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Aaron C. Ballt 
Thomas R. Rustt 
Effective August 15, 1989, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (the "Commission") adopted Rule 15a-6. 1 This rule provides 
for conditional exemptions from broker-dealer registration under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 for foreign entities engaged in 
certain limited securities activities in the United States.3 In the 1988 
proposing release,4 the Commission recognized that the "world's se-
curities markets rapidly [were] becoming international in scope."5 
Examples included the relatively common occurrence of multina-
tional offerings, and the increased trend toward foreign and domes-
tic broker-dealers establishing international offices, and the develop-
ment of linkages between trading markets. The Commission cited 
this internationalization of the securities industry as th~ basis for 
adopting Rule 15a-6.6 
However, more than a decade later, with the advent of the 
Euro, the introduction of Electronic Communications Networks 
t B.A., 1994, Loyola College; J.D., 1997, University of Baltimore School of Law; 
Member, Maryland State Bar Association, American Bar Association; Vice Pres-
ident and Chief Compliance Officer, AmSouth Bank and AmSouth Invest-
ment Servs., Inc.; Professional Certifications: Series 5, 7, 24, 63. 
tt B.A., 1981, Fordham University; J.D., 1986, Columbia University; Member, New 
York State Bar Association and Maryland State Bar Association; Vice President 
and Counsel, Allfirst Bank. 
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (1999). 
2. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd (1997). 
3. See Internationalization of the Securities Markets, Report of the Staff of the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, at V - 41 to V - 49 (July 27, 1987) ("Report on Internationaliza-
tion"). 
4. See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645 (June 23, 1988). 
5. [d. at 23,648. 
6. See id. 
175 
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("ECNs"), the impact of technology and the Internet, the recent 
trends in financial reform, and a continuing shift towards industry 
consolidation through international mergers and acquisitions, the 
securities industry must reevaluate Rule 15a-6.7 This Article exam-
ines whether Rule 15a-6 has outlived its usefulness in light of the 
objectives of U.S. securities laws and regulations - to establish and 
promote markets that are fair and efficient (and are perceived as 
such by participants) and the fact that in a post-Cold War world, na-
tional boundaries have seemingly become secondary to market im-
peratives. To that end, Part II reviews the historical background 
leading to the adoption of Rule 15a-6.8 Part III discusses the adopt-
ing release for the Rule.9 Part IV evaluates the exemptions from re-
gistration for the foreign broker.lo Finally, Part V presents and ana-
lyzes comments received by the CommissionY 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND LEADING TO ADOPTION OF 
RULE 15a-6 
The internationalization of financial markets has been an area 
of considerable debate, review and revision during the past few de-
cades.12 The Commission has often been prompted to revisit and ex-
pand its position on foreign broker-dealer activity by a U.S. securi-
ties industry anxious to compete on a global scale.13 
In 1964, the Presidential Task Force on Promoting Increased 
Foreign Investment in United States Corporate Securities and In-
creased Foreign Financing for United States Corporations Operat-
ing Abroad ("Task Force") urged the Commission to clarifY its posi-
tion on foreign affairs. 14 In June of 1988, the Task Force 
recommended that the Commission publish a release setting forth 
its position on the registration, under the Securities Act of 1933,15 
of offerings made by U.S. issuers outside the United States.16 In ad-
7. See Repon on Internationalization, supra note 3, at 11-88 to 11-90. 
8. See infra notes 12-53 and accompanying text. . 
9. See infra notes 54-80 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 81-122 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra notes 123-92 and accompanying text. 
12. See Lisa K. Bostwick, The SEC Response to International and Institutionalization: 
Ruk 144A Merit Regulation of InvestfffS, 23 lAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 423 (1996). 
13. See, e.g., Tensions High as Exchanges, ECNs Face Change, SEC INDUS. NEWS, May 
15, 2000, availabk in 2000 WL 4049812. 
14. See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645 (June 23, 1988). 
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1994). 
16. See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Re-
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dition, the Task Force suggested a release be published on the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934's ("Exchange Act")17 registration for 
foreign underwriters participating in distributions of U.S. issuers' se-
curities exclusively to nonresidents of the United States. IS In June of 
1988, the Commission initially responded with the Registration Re-
quirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers Exchange Act Release No. 
25,80V9 
Further, the Commission published Securities Act Release No. 
4708 ("Release 4708"),20 which identified the conditions under 
which a foreign underwriter of a U.S. issuer's foreign offering of se-
curities would not be required to register as a broker-dealer under 
Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act. 21 The Commission indicated 
that registration was not required if a foreign broker-dealer limited 
its participation in a foreign offering of U.S. securities or the for-
eign part of a multinational offering of such securities to: (1) sell-
ing securities outside the United States to non-U.S. persons; and (2) 
participating in an underwriting syndicate in which all U.S. activi-
ties, such as sales to selling group members, stabilization, over-
allotment, and group sales, were carried out for the syndicate exclu-
sively by a managing underwriter or underwriters registered with 
the Commission.22 Nevertheless, registration would be required 
where a foreign broker-dealer sold securities in the United States or 
purchased securities in the United States for sale to U.S. investors 
abroad.23 
Until Rule 15a-6, however, the Commission had traditionally in-
sisted upon broker-dealer registration of foreign firms dealing with 
U.S. investors.24 In 1967, the Commission indicated that: 
lease No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645 (June 23, 1988). 
17. See supra note 2. 
18. See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645 (June 23, 1988). 
19. See id. 
20. See Interpretive Releases Relating to the Securities Act of 1933 and General 
Rules and Regulations Thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 231 (1999). This release was 
denominated also as Securities Exchange Act release 7366. It addressed both 
the need for registration under the Securities Act for securities sold abroad, 
and registration under the Exchange Act for foreign broker-dealers participat-
ing in a foreign offering of securities of U.S. issuers. See id. 
21. See id. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
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[W]hile we sometimes raise no objection if a broker-dealer, 
without registration, buys securities in the United States and 
sells them outside the jurisdiction of the United States to 
persons other than United States nationals[,J25 we would 
not be willing to take such a no-action position as to bro-
ker-dealer registration if a broker-dealer sells any securities, 
even foreign securities, to United States nationals.26 
However, even prior to the Rule 15a-6 proposing release, the 
Commission began to relax its position by granting a number of 
"no-action requests to foreign broker-dealers" that wished to create 
contacts with U.S. institutions, through the registered broker-dealer 
affiliates.27 These no-action positions imposed the responsibility for 
many facets of U.S. persons' accounts upon the registered broker-
dealer.28 
The Commission further indicated that U.S. institutional inves-
tors receiving research from a foreign broker-dealer affiliate of a 
U.S. bank holding company must be mediated by the U.S. inves-
tor.29 Furthermore, if a U.S. institutional investor that obtained such 
research contacts a foreign broker-dealer, a registered representa-
tive of the U.S. affiliate would be required to participate in all com-
munications between the foreign broker-dealer and the U.S. inves-
25. "The [Commission] also has taken no-action positions concerning the sale of 
U.S. securities by foreign broker-dealers to foreign investors outside the 
United States, where the securities were obtained in U.S. secondary markets 
through a registered broker-dealer." [d. (citing letter from Francis R. 
Snodgrass, Associate Director, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to M. 
David Hyman, Director of Legal & Compliance Department, Bear, Steams & 
Co. Gan. 7, 1976». 
26. [d. (citing letter from Robert Block, Chief Counsel, Division of Trading and 
Markets, SEC, to Roberto Luna (Feb. 21, 1967». Moreover, Section 30(b) of 
the Exchange Act limits the Commission's jurisdictional reach only "insofar as 
[a person] transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the 
United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
to prevent the evasion of [Title 15]." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1994). 
27. See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 25,801,53 Fed. Reg. 23,645, 23,647 (1988). 
28. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 4. Other responsibilities include "taking 
orders directly from the U.S. persons, holding the accounts, confirming the 
trades, and maintaining all book and records on transactions for the U.S. per-
sons." [d. 
29. See 53 Fed. Reg. 23,647 (1988) (referring to a letter from Amy Natterson Kroll, 
Attorney, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Frank Puleo, Esq., Milbank, 
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy dated July 28, 1987). 
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tor. 30 Should orders result from these conversations, the U.S. 
broker-dealer would execute any orders and manage the accounts 
of the U.S. institutional investors,31 
The Commission also adopted temporary no-action positions in 
which market maker quotations collected and published by a for-
eign exchange were distributed in the United States.32 Although for-
eign market makers who give quotes displayed in the United States 
could effect transactions in securities with regard to U.S. broker-
dealer registration provisions,33 the Commission granted the request 
for a temporary no-action position.34 In doing so, the Commission 
sought to promote access to information on foreign market condi-
tions.35 However, the Commission made clear that any actions by 
market makers leading to substantial U.S. contacts, other than the 
passive circulation of foreign market makers' quotes and conse-
quential trades, were outside the realm of a no-action position.36 
The Commission opined that "[sJolicitation includes efforts to 
induce a single transaction or to develop an ongoing securities busi-
ness relationship. "37 Solicitation may be any affirmative effort by a 
broker or a dealer intended to induce transactional business for the 
30. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. See id. The Commission approved a six-month pilot program for the NASDI 
ISE link. See id. at n.23 (citing Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,158, 51 
Fed. Reg. 15,989 (Apr. 21, 1986». 
33. See id. (citing letter from Robert L.D. Colby, Deputy Chief Counsel, Division 
of Market Regulation, SEC, to Richard B. Smith, Esq., Davis, Polk & Wardwell . 
dated July 3, 1986). 
34. See id. (citing letter from Mary Chamberlin, Chief Counsel, Division of Market 
Regulation, SEC, to Frank J. Wilson, General Counsel, NASD dated May 7, 
1986). "The [Commission] accorded a parallel temporary no-action position 
to the ISE regarding the dissemination of SEAQ quotation information in the 
United States through the ISE's own information vendor, TOPIC." [d. (citing 
letter from Robert L.D. Colby, Chief Counsel, Division of Market Regulation, 
SEC, to Richard B. Smith, Esq., Davis, Polk & Wardwell dated Nov. 28, 1986). 
"Similarly, the [Commission] issued a no-action letter regarding a pilot pro-
gram providing for an exchange of quotations between NASDAQ and the Sin-
gapore Stock Exchange." [d. (citing letter from Amy Natterson Kroll, Attor-
ney, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Frank J. Wilson, General Counsel, 
NASD dated Dec. 11, 1987; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,457, 53 
Fed. Reg. 9156 (1988». 
35. See 53 Fed. Reg. 23,647 (1988). 
36. See id. 
37. [d. at 23,650. 
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broker-dealer or its affiliates.38 Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act 
refers to both inducing or attempting to induce the purchase or 
sale of securities.39 The activities generally viewed as involving solici-
tation included: telephone calls from a broker-dealer to a customer 
encouraging use of the broker-dealer to effect transactions; running 
investment seminars for U.S. investors regardless of whether the 
seminars are hosted by a registered U.S. broker-dealer; advertising 
the activities of foreign broker-dealers and their willingness to trade 
foreign securities in U.S. newspapers or periodicals of general circu-
lation in United States or on any radio or television station whose 
broadcasting is directed into the United States;40 publishing quotes 
in the United States;41 and "providing advice about foreign securi-
ties (particularly where the advice is provided in return for broker-
age commissions on transactions placed with the foreign broker-
dealer). "42 
In 1986, the Commission exempted a number of foreign bro-
ker-dealers from broker-dealer registration requirements, even 
though they acted as dealers in the United States.43 Citicorp, a U.S. 
38. See id. "[The] key to the issue of solicitation is whether the foreign broker-
dealer's contacts with U.S. markets reasonably may be viewed as attempting to 
induce an investor's purchase or sale of a security." [d. at n.54 (citing Report 
on Internationalization, supra note 3, at V42; letter from David Romanski, At-
torney, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Hugh Seymour, Hoare & 
Covett, Ltd. dated Sept. 28, 1973). 
39. "Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act requires registration of brokers and deal-
ers that effect transactions or 'induce or attempt to induce the purchase or 
sale of, any security.'" [d. at n.53 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 780(a». 
40. See id. at 23,646 (citing letter from David Romanski, Attorney, Division of Mar-
ket Regulation, SEC, to Hugh Seymour, Hoare & Covett, Ltd. dated Sept. 28, 
1973). 
41. See id. (citing letter from Michael Saperstein, Associate Director, Division of 
Market Regulation, SEC, to Irving Marmer, Esq. dated Dec. 4, 1972). "[A] for-
eign entity distributing ... stock quotations to U.S. subscribers and receiving 
buy and sell orders from the subscribers, to be executed on foreign securities 
exchanges, was denied a no-action position." [d. at n.12. 
42. [d. (citing letter from Eric Thompson, Attorney, Division of Market Regula-
tion, SEC, to Richard D. Haynes, Esq., Haynes and Boone dated Aug. 23, 
1974). 
43. [d. at 23,647 (citing letter from Jonathan Katz, Secretary, SEC, to Marcia 
MacHarg, Esq., Debevoise & Plimpton (dated Aug. 13, 19, 1986) (Vickers da 
Costa/Citicorp». "Section 15 (a) (2) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
780 (a) (2), authorizes the Commission to exempt any broker, dealer, or class 
thereof, conditionally or unconditionally, from the broker-dealer registration 
requirements, consistent with the public interest and the protection of inves-
tors." [d. at n.29. 
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bank holding company, owned the foreign broker-dealers, and 
sought to purchase a U.S. affiliate of the foreign broker-dealers 
through its U.S. bank subsidiary, Citibank.44 In addition, the U.S. af-
filiate was an active market maker in NASDAQ and a registered U.S. 
broker-dealer.45 Due to laws precluding Citibank from owning a 
market maker,46 the U.S. affiliate's activities were restricted to exe-
cuting those orders received from U.S. customers against those 
standing orders provided by the foreign broker-dealers.47 
Subject to four conditions, the Commission permitted foreign 
broker-dealers to purchase and sell shares at the same time through 
the U.S. affiliate without registering as domestic broker-dealers.48 
First, the Commission limited the price and size of the foreign bro-
ker-dealers' outstanding orders.49 Consequently, the U.S. affiliate 
was able to exercise some discretion in its trading activities.50 Sec-
ond, as a safeguard against possible failure of the foreign-broker 
dealers, the U.S. affiliate agreed to increase its net capital require-
ments to ensure its settlement obligations.51 Third, Citicorp agreed 
to cooperate with. Commission investigations by disclosing informa-
tion to the Commission regarding the trading activities of the for-
eign broker-dealers.52 Lastly, Citicorp agreed to serve as "the foreign 
broker-dealers' agent for service of process in· any actions involving 
the foreign broker-dealers. "53 
44. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,801, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,645, 23,647 
(1988). 
45. See id. 
46. See id. ("Because the Glass-Steagall Act prevented Citibank from owning a 
market maker, the foreign broker-dealers entered into a contractual agree-
ment with the U.S. affiliate that called for the foreign broker-dealers to pro-
vide standing orders to buy and sell the securities in which the U.S. affiliate 
had previously acted as a market maker."). 
47. See id. at 23,648. "This arrangement was approved by the Comptroller of the 
Currency." Id. at n.32 (citing letter from Judith A. Walter, Senior Deputy 
Comptroller, to Ellis E. Bradford, Vice President, Citibank, N.A. dated Jun. 
13, 1986). 
48. See id. at 23,648. 
49. See id. 
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. "Citicorp represented that information regarding the trading activities 
of the foreign broker-dealers would be made available to the ~ommission in 
connection with any investigation, and that it would attempt to obtain cus-
tomer consent to release of information concerning their trading, if re-
quested." Id. 
53. Id. 
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III. THE ADOPTING RELEASE FOR RULE 15a-6 
In 1989, the Commission adopted Rule 15a-6 under section 
15 (a) (2) of the Exchange Act.54 Rule 15a-6 provides for conditional 
exemptions from broker-dealer registration for foreign entities en-
gaged in certain activities involving U.S. investors and securities 
markets.55 Unless otherwise exempted, section 15 (a) of the Ex-
change Act requires any broker-dealer that uses any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce to effect transactions or to in-
duce the purchase or sale of any security, to register as a broker-
dealer.56 Sections 3(a) (4) and 3(a) (5) of the Exchange Act define 
the terms "broker" and "dealer" to apply to "any person" without a 
limiting requirement of U.S. citizenship.57 Accordingly, section 15(a) 
"literally applies to foreign broker-dealers who use the mails or in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce to offer or sell securities. "58 
The reasons underlying the Commission's adoption of Rule 
15a-6 were two-fold. First, the rule was intended "to facilitate access 
to foreign markets by U.S. institutional investors through foreign 
broker-dealers and the research that they provide, consistent with 
maintaining the safeguards afforded by broker-dealer registration. "59 
Second, the rule was intended "to provide clear guidance to foreign 
broker-dealers seeking to operate in compliance with U.S. broker-
dealer registration requirements."6O 
By the time Rule 15a-6 was adopted, all broker-dealers effect-
ing, inducing or attempting to induce any securities transactions in 
the United States were required to register as broker-dealers with 
the Commission.61 However, domestic entities were not subject to 
the same requirements if they conducted their activities entirely 
54. See Exchange Act Release No. 27,017,54 Fed. Reg. 30,031 Uuly 18, 1989). 
55. See id. 
56. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6 (1999). 
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (4),(5) (1995). 
58. 6 LoUiS Loss & JOEL SEUGMAN, SECURITIES REGUlATION 3012 (3d ed. 1990); see 
id. at n.1l7 ("Section 3(a) (17) defines 'interstate commerce' to mean 'trade, 
transportation, or commerce . . . between any foreign country and any state 
... "'). 
59. Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker Dealers, Exchange Act Release 
No. 27,017, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,013 (1989). 
60. [d. 
61. See 6 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 58, at 3017-18. This Commission require-
ment has been called the "territorial" approach, and applied equally to activi-
ties directed to foreign investors outside the United States. See id. at 3018. 
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outside the United States.62 
In addition, the Commission applied the registration require-
ments and regulatory system governing domestic brokers to those 
foreign broker-dealer entities operating a branch in the United 
States.63 However, if the foreign broker-dealer established an affiliate 
in the United States, only that affiliate was required to register as a 
broker-dealer.64 As such, absent certain exemptions, only the regis-
tered U.S. affiliate would be permitted to trade with U.S. investors 
or perform securities functions on behalf of those customers.65 Such 
functions include effecting trades, extending credit, maintaining 
records and issuing confirmations, and receiving, delivering, and 
safeguarding funds and securities.66 The Commission, however, ex-
pressly stated that if an introducing-clearing relationship existed, 
where the foreign broker-dealer held U.S. customers' funds and se-
curities, registration of the foreign broker-dealer would be 
required.67 
The territorial approach employed by the Commission gener-
ally required registration by foreign broker-dealers that, from 
outside the United States, induced or attempted to induce trades by 
persons in the United States.68 The Commission indicated, however, 
that it would not require foreign broker-dealers to register when 
dealing from abroad with foreign persons domiciled abroad but 
temporarily present in the United States.69 Furthermore, the Com-
mission did not require registration when a foreign broker-dealer 
effected trades outside the United States for U.S. citizens residing 
abroad, so long as the foreign broker-dealer had no other contacts 
within the jurisdiction of the United States.70 
62. See id. 
63. See id. This Commission requirement has been called the "entity" approach. 
See id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (b) (3) (1999). 
64. &e 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 58, at 3018; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-
6(a)(2)(iii) (1995). Similarly, only the affiliate's personnel must be licensed 
appropriately by the NASD or another Self-Regulatory Organization ("SRO"). 
See § 3(a) (18) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(18) (1999). 
65. See Registration Requirements for Foreign Broker Dealers, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 27,017, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,017 (1989). 
66. See id. 
67. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,029. 
68. See id. at 30,017. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. "The Commission historically has taken the view, however, that foreign 
broker-dealers specifically targeting identifiable groups of U.S. persons resid-
ing abroad, e.g., U.S. military and embassy personnel, could be subject to U.S. 
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The requirements of section 15(a) do not distinguish between 
solicited and unsolicited transactions. 71 Nevertheless, the Commis-
sion indicated, that as a matter of policy, U.S. registration would 
not be necessary if a c!omestic investor, on its own initiative, sought 
out a foreign broker-dealer outside the United States and initiated 
transactions in foreign securities markets.72 The Commission rea-
soned that U.S. investors initiating trades outside the United States 
would not expect the foreign broker-dealer to be subject to U.S. 
broker-dealer regulations.73 The Commission also noted that foreign 
broker-dealers would very likely refuse to deal with U.S. persons 
under any circumstances if required to comply with U.S. registra-
tion requirements as a result of these unsolicited trades.74 
Numerous commentators argued for narrowing the definition 
of "solicitation. "75 However, the Commission favors a broad con-
struction of "solicitation," as the express language of section 
15 (a) (1) refers to both inducing or attempting to induce the 
purchase or sale of securities.76 
The Commission, however, has permitted certain activities per-
ceived to be "solicitation" without the requirement of registration. 
For example, the Commission continues to allow U.S. distribution 
of foreign broker-dealers' quotations by third party systems without 
requiring registration.77 In addition, the Commission has indicated 
that foreign broker-dealers would not have to register if the scope 
of their U.S. activities were limited to contacts with registered bra-
ker-dealers and banks acting as broker-dealers.78 
broker-dealer registration requirements." Id. 
71. See id. 
72. See id. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. 
75. See id. at 30,018. Commentators such as Fidelity Investments, Madrid Stock Ex-
change, an'd Dechert, Price & Rhoads argued for the more narrow definition. 
See id. at n.57. 
76. See id. at 30,018. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. at 30,020. Banks acting as broker-dealers may include banks that act as 
government or municipal securities dealers. See Registration Requirements for 
Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 27,017, 43 SEC Docket 
2445, 2477 Guly 18, 1989); see also National Westminster Bank PLC, SEC No-
Action Letter, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,881 
Guly 7, 1988); Security Pac. Corp., 1988-1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,883 
Guly 7, 1988). 
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Rule 15a-6 codified and broadened these exemptions. Under 
section 15 (a) (2) of the Rule, the Commission established four ex-
emptions that permit foreign broker-dealers to engage in certain ac-
tivities without U.S. registration.79 Under the Rule, a foreign broker-
dealer may rely on different exemptions for different transactions.80 
N. EXEMPTIONS FOR REGISTRATION UNDER RULE 15a-6 
Rule 15a-6, in effect, establishes exemptions for various broker-
dealer/investor contacts and broker-dealer/investor research 
provisions.81 
A. Unsolicited or Nondirect Contacts 
Under Rule 15a-6(a) (1), a foreign broker-dealer is not required 
to register to the extent that it "effects transactions in securities 
with or for persons that have not been solicited by the foreign bro-
ker or dealer. "82 Therefore, a foreign broker-dealer could effect un-
solicited trades for U.S. investors without the use of a U.S. regis-
tered broker-dealer intermediary. Although the Rule itself does not 
specifically define "solicitation," the Commission indicated that the 
term would be best addressed on a case-by-case basis consistent with 
Rule 15a-6 proposing and adopting releases.83 
B. Providing Research to Major u.s. Institutional Investors 
In general, the Commission considers any deliberate transmis-
sion of information, opinions, or recommendations to U.S. investors 
as a solicitation, whether directed at individuals or groups. However, 
Rule 15a-6(a) (2) provides a conditional exemption from registration 
for foreign brokers or dealers that furnish research reports84 to in-
79. See discussion, infra Part Iv. 
80. 6 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 58, at 3021. 
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a (1999). These exemptions include: "(1) unsolicited or 
nondirect contacts between an unregistered foreign broker-dealer and United 
States investors; (2) the provision of research by an unregistered foreign bro-
ker-dealer to major United States institutional investors; (3) direct contacts be-
tween an unregistered foreign broker-dealer and United States investors if the 
resulting transactions are effected through a registered broker-dealer; and (4) 
direct contacts between an unregistered foreign broker-dealer and five catego-
ries of persons with no condition that a registered broker-dealer act as an in-
termediary." [d. 
82. 17 C.ER. § 240.15a-6(a) (1) (1999). 
83. See id. 
84. Paragraph (a) (2) of the Rule does not distinguish between research reports 
provided in written or electronic form. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (2) (1999). 
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vestors in the United States, and effect transactions with those inves-
tors in the securities discussed in the research reports.85 This ex-
emption is available to foreign broker-dealers, provided that they: 
[Furnished] research reports are provided only to major 
U.S. institutional investors [ only] ;86 the research reports do 
not recommend the use of the foreign broker or dealer to 
effect trades in any security; the foreign broker or dealer 
does not initiate contact with those major U.S. institutional 
investors to follow up on the research reports, and does not 
otherwise induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale 
of any security by those major U.S. institutional investors; if 
the foreign broker or dealer has a relationship with a regis-
tered broker or dealer that satisfies the requirements of 
Rule 15(a) (3), any transactions with the foreign broker or 
dealer in securities discussed in the research reports are ef-
fected only through that registered broker or dealer, pursu-
ant to the provisions of paragraph (a)(3); and the foreign 
broker or dealer does not provide research reports to U.S. 
8S. See id. 
86. A "major U.S. institutional investor" is a "U.S. institutional investor" or regis-
tered investment adviser that has total assets or assets under management of 
more than $100 million dollars. The term "U.S. institutional investor" is de-
fined in Rule lSa-6(b)(7) to mean: "(1) an investment company registered 
with the Commission under section 8 ·of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
[i.e. mutual funds]; or (2) a bank, savings and loan association, insurance 
company, business development company, small business investment com-
pany, or employee benefit plan defined in Rule SOl of Regulation D under 
the Securities Act of 1933; a private business development company defined 
in Rule SOl (a) (2); an organization described in section S01(c)(3) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, as defined in Rule SOl(a)(3); or a trust defined in Rule 
SOl(a)(7)." 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Sa-6(b)(7)(citations omitted). In 1997, the Com-
mission confirmed its no action advice rega~ding the expansion of the defini-
tion of "major U.S. institutional investor." The Commission defined "major 
U.S. institutional investor" to include, under all applicable provisions of Rule 
lSa-6 and interpretations thereunder, any entity, including any investment ad-
viser (whether or not registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940), 
that owns or controls (or, in the case of an investment adviser, has under 
management) in excess of $100 million in aggregate financial assets. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.1Sa-6(b) (4). 
As to the registered investment adviser definition, to determine the total as-
sets of an investment company under the Rule, a registered investment com-
pany may include the assets of any family of investment companies of which it 
is a part, and the term "family of investment companies" is defined in para-
graph (b) (1) of the Rule. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,026. 
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persons pursuant to an express or implied understanding 
that those U.S. persons will direct commission income to 
the foreign broker or dealer.87 
187 
This exemption is based upon the Commission's recogmtIOn 
that broker-dealers often provide securities research to investors 
without charging a fee, with the expectation that the investor will 
trade through the broker-dealer. Although such practices could be 
deemed solicitation, the Rule provides for the limited exceptions 
outlined above. So long as the foreign broker-dealer does not rec-
ommend itself for use in effecting trades in any security, and if the 
foreign broker-dealer does not initiate follow-up contact with the 
major U.S. institutional investors receiving the research, or other-
wise does not induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of 
any security, the foreign broker-dealer's activities would fall within 
the scope of 15a-6(a) (2) and thus be permissible.88 The Commission 
has indicated that "direct distribution would be consistent with the 
free flow of information across national boundaries without raising 
substantial investor protection concerns. "89 
The Commission emphasized, however, that 15a-6(a) (2) is not 
available for "soft dollar" arrangements between foreign broker-
dealers and U.S. persons.90 The exemption for research in para-
graph (a) (2) would be inapplicable because if a foreign broker-
dealer provided research to U.S. investors pursuant to an under-
standing that the foreign broker-dealer would receive a commission, 
they would be considered to have induced purchases.91 
Although this exemption is limited to major U.S. institutional 
investors, the Rule's research exemption is broader than either the 
proposed interpretive statement or the expanded rule, in that a reg-
87. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (2); 6 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 58, at 3016; see also 
Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,021.. 
88. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text. 
89. Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,022. 
90. Id. at 30,023; Inspection Report on the Soft Dollar Practices of Broker-Dealers, Invest-
ment Advisors and Mutual Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N. OFFICE OF 
CoMPUANCE. INSPEGnONS AND EXAMINERS. Sept. 22, 1998, at 6. 
91. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,023. "If a foreign broker-dealer 
provided research to a U.S. investor pursuant to an express or implied under-
standing that the investor would direct a given amount of commission income 
to the foreign broker-dealer, the Commission would consider the foreign bro-
ker-dealer to have induced purchases and sales of securities, irrespective of 
whether the trades received from the investor related to the particular re-
search that had been provided." Id. 
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istered broker-dealer would not be required to take responsibility 
for the content of the report received by the foreign broker-dealer.92 
If, however, a foreign broker-dealer, for its own reasons, chose to 
distribute its research in the United States through a registered bra-
ker-dealer, affiliated or not, NASD Conduct Rule 2210 would re-
quire certain disclosures as a component of the research reports. 
NASD Conduct Rule 2210 requires that all "[a]dvertisements and 
sales literature shall contain the name of the [NASD] member, ... 
[and of] the person or firm preparing the material, if other than 
the member .... "93 Furthermore, "[s]tatistical tables, charts, graphs 
or other illustrations used by members . . . should disclose the 
source of the information if not prepared by the member. "94 
By its terms, Rule 15a-6(a)(2) is only available when research is 
provided to major U.S. institutional investors and the foreign bra-
ker-dealer does not engage in any follow-up or solicitation of such 
investors. The Commission, therefore, adopted the interpretative 
position outside Rule 15a-6. Under this position, it would not re-
quire a foreign broker-dealer to register when its research reports 
were distributed to U.S. persons, other than major U.S. institutional 
investors, by a registered broker-dealer. However, the research re-
port at issue stated that the foreign broker-dealer bore responsibility 
for its contents and that U.S. persons who wished to engage in 
92. See id. 
93. NASD REGUlATION INC., NASD Conduct Rule 221O(d) (2)(A) (1999). 
94. Id. at Rule 2210(d) (2) (K). Under Rule 221O(a) (2), "sales literature" specifi-
cally includes "research reports, market letters, performance reports or sum-
maries .... " Id. at Rule 221O(a) (2). NASD Conduct Rule 2210 establishes the 
standards applicable to all communications made by a member firm to the 
public through advertisements and sales literature. Sub-paragraph (d)(l) sets 
forth the general standards of disclosure for advertising and sales literature. 
Under the-Rule, a member firm's advertising and sales literature must be ap-
proved by a registered principal of 'the member prior to release or filing with 
the NASD. See id. at Rule 2210 (b) (1).' It is the responsibility of the registered 
principal to ensure that the advertising or sales piece complies with the stan-
dards set forth in the Rule. See id. Under sub-paragraph (c), a member firm is 
required to file certain types of advertising and sales literature with the NASD 
within 10 days of first use or publication by the member firm. See id. at 
2210(c) (1). The member firm must provide the actual or anticipated date of 
first use with the filing. See id. The filing requirements, however, are applica-
ble only to advertisements and sales literature concerning registered invest-
ment companies. See id. Advertisements and sales literature used to market 
foreign equities would not require filing with the NASD. Such advertisements 
and sales literature, however, must still comply with the general and specific 
standards set forth in the Rule. See id. 
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transactions of securities mentioned in the report could only do so 
with the registered broker-dealer.95 . 
C. Solicited Sales in the United States 
Subject to certain conditions, Rule 15a-6(a) (3) permits foreign 
brokers or dealers, without registering, to induce or attempt to in-
duce the purchase or sale of any security by "U.S. institutional in-
vestors"96 or "major U.S. institutional investors, "97 provided the re-
sulting securities transactions are effected through an intermediary 
registered broker-dealer.98 Compliance with paragraph (a) (3) is 
predicated on the condition that solicitations are to be directed 
only to a U.S. institutional investor or to a major U.S. institutional 
investor.99 The Commission reasoned that: 
[M] any foreign broker-dealers have established registered 
broker-dealer affiliates in the United States that are fully 
95. Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,023. The registered: 
[B]roker-dealer prominently stated on the research report that it had 
accepted responsibility for its content if the research report promi-
nently stated that any United States persons receiving the research 
and wishing to effect any transactions in any security discussed in the 
report should do so with the registered broker-dealer, not the for-
eign broker-dealer and if the transactions with United States recipi-
ents of the report . . . were effected only with or through the regis-
tered broker-dealer and not the foreign broker-dealer. 
[d. Notably, 
[T]he Commission [indicated that it] would not require registration 
by a foreign broker-dealer whose research reports were included in a 
broadly-distributed electronic database to which U.S. persons who 
were not major U.S. institutional investors had access, provided that 
(i) a registered broker-dealer accepted responsibility for the research 
and for its inclusion in the database, (ii) the registered broker-dealer 
prominently stated on the research report, as displayed in the 
database, that it had accepted responsibility for its content, and (iii) 
the research report prominently indicated that any U.S: persons ac-
cessing the report and wishing to effect any transaction in the securi-
ties discussed in the report should do so with the registered broker-
dealer, not the foreign broker-deaIer. This position does not limit the 
research exemption in paragraph (a) (2) for research distributed di-
rectly to major U.S. institutional investors, whether in written or elec-
tronic form. 
[d. n.114. 
96. 17 c.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (3) (1998). 
97. Id. 
98. See id. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (3) (i) (A). 
99. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(3). 
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qualified to deal with U.S. investors and trade in U.S. secur-
ities. Nonetheless, these foreign broker-dealers may prefer 
to deal with institutional investors in the United States from 
their overseas trading desks, where their dealer operations 
are based. In addition, because overseas trading desks often 
are principal sources of current information on foreign 
market conditions and foreign securities, many U.S. institu-
tions want direct contact with overseas traders. Foreign bro-
ker-dealers themselves often are not willing to register as 
broker-dealers directly with the Commission, however, be-
cause registration would require the entire firm to comply 
with U.S. broker-dealer requirements. loo 
A predicate to compliance with paragraph (a) (3) is that solici-
tations may be directed only to "a U.S. institutional investor or a 
major U.S. institutional investor. "101 A foreign broker-dealer may so-
licit investors so long as the resulting transactions are effected 
through the registered broker-dealer in accordance with paragraph 
(a) (3) (iii).lOZ In addition, the foreign broker-dealer must generally 
submit to information requests by the Commission. lo3 The foreign 
broker's representative must not be subject to the "bad boy" provi-
sions of sections 3(a)(39)104 and 15(b)(4),I05 and must conduct all 
securities activities from outside the United States, with an impor-
tant exception: foreign representatives may visit U.S. institutional in-
vestors and major U.S. institutional investors if the foreign represen-
tative is accompanied by a representative of the registered broker-
dealer.lo6 In addition to chaperoning the foreign broker, the regis-
tered broker must take responsibility for the foreign broker's U.S. 
100. Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,024. The no-action request granted 
to Chase Capital Markets US allowed foreign trading operations to receive 
calls from U.S. institutional investors without the foreign broker-dealers regis-
tering with the Commission. Under the terms of that letter, foreign broker-
dealers could be put in touch with U.S. institutional investors by a registered 
broker-dealer affiliate, with a U.S.-qualified representative participating in tele-
phone conversations, effecting any resulting transactions, and taking full re-
sponsibility for the trades. Id. (citing letter from Amy Natterson Kroll, Attor-
ney, Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, to Frank C. 
Puleo, Esq., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (dated July 28, 1987». 
101. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(3) (1998). 
102. See id. § 240.15a-6(a)(3) (i)(A). 
103. See id. § 240.15a-6(a) (3) (i)(B). 
104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (39) (1999). 
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (4) (1999). 
106. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(3)(ii)(A)(1) (1998). 
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communications, and must effect transactions in any secuntIes dis-
cussed during the chaperoned visits. 107 Section (a) (3)(iii) sets forth 
the responsibilities of the registered broker-dealer in connection 
with the activities covered by Rule 15a-6.108 
In a fine example of circular regulation, section (a) (3) (i) (A) 
requires that the foreign broker must effect transactions through 
the registered broker "in the manner described by paragraph 
(a) (3) (iii)."I09 Section (a) (3) (iii) (A) (1) accomplishes this by simply 
repeating that the registered entity is only responsible for effecting 
transactions, rather than negotiating the terms. I1O The concept that 
transactions are "effected through" the registered broker is clearly 
important; but ascertaining what is meant by that phrase is elusive. 
The requirement that transactions be "effected through" registered 
entities has not been elaborated upon in the proposing or adopting 
releases. NASD Regulation Inc. addressed the issue in a 1998 Notice 
to Members.11l In addition, the Commission has also issued several 
no-action positions. ll2 
In the absence of anything more definitive, it seems plausible 
that "effecting through" is simply intended to encompass the re-
sponsibilities covered in paragraphs (a) (3) (iii) (A) (2)-(6). Among 
those responsibilities are: issuing confirmations and statements; ar-
ranging the extension of credit on margin transactions; maintaining 
books and records as required under Exchange Act Rules 17a-3 and 
17a-4; complying with Rule 15c3-1 net capital requirements; and 
complying with· 15c3-3 rules as to physical possession and control, 
and required reserve accounts.ll3 
Paragraphs (a) (3) (iii) (B) through (E) cover miscellaneous is-
sues such as the need for the registered broker to obtain consent to 
service of process and Form U-4 type information from the foreign 
representatives,114 as well as a parallel to the paragraph (a) (3) (ii) 
107. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(3)(ii)(A) (1999). These sections specifically pro-
vide an exception to the general rule that people associated with foreign bro-
kers must conduct all securities activities outside of the United States. See id. 
An individual associated with a foreign broker is allowed to conduct visits to 
U.S. institutional investors if this individual is accompanied by a person associ-
ated with a registered broker. See id. § 240.15a-6(a) (3) (ii) (A)(I). 
108. See id. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (3) (iii) (A) (1)-(6). 
109. Id. § 240. 15a-6. 
110. See id. § 240.15a-6(a)(3)(iii) (A) (1). 
111. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text. 
112. See infra notes 137-54 and accompanying text. 
113. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (3) (iii)(A) (1999). 
114. See id. § 240. 15a-6 (a)(3) (iii) (B)-(E). 
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chaperoning requirement. 
D. Transactions with U.S. Brokers and Others 
Paragraph (a) (4) of Rule 15a-6 provides an exemption from re-
gistration to foreign broker-dealers that solicit or transact business 
only with, among others, registered broker dealers or banks.1l5 How-
ever, the exclusion for transactions with banks may no longer be 
valid after the effectiveness, in May 2001, of the "push-out" provi-
sions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.116 The purpose of the 
Act is to "enhance competition in the financial services industry."117 
It also provides a "framework for the affiliation of banks, securities 
firms, insurance companies, and other financial serVice 
providers." 118 
Under Rule 15a-6, a foreign broker-dealer may transact business 
with certain other persons or entities.Il9 This list of other persons or 
entities includes certain international agencies,120 foreign persons 
temporarily in the United States with whom the foreign broker had 
an existing relationship,121 and U.S. persons either permanently lo-
cated or resident outside the United States, so long as the foreign 
broker does not target identifiable groups of U.S. citizens who are 
resident abroad. 122 
115. See id. § 240.15a-6(a) (4)(i). 
116. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1228 (1999). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. Among other things, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act eliminates the historic 
exclusion of banks from the definitions of "broker" and "dealer" in sections 
3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act. See id. § 201.20. Other than certain 
limited exceptions for traditional banking activities, a bank engaging in bro-
kerage activities must register as a broker-dealer. See generaUy § 201.20: There-
fore, the Rule 15a-6(a) (4) exclusion for transactions with banks may be a 
dead letter. 
119. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (4) (1999). 
120. See id. § 240.15a-6(a)( 4) (ii). Examples include the United Nations and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. See id. 
121. See id. § 240.15a-6(a) (4). 
122. See id. 
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V. COMMENTS RECEIVED BY THE COMMISSION 
A. Intermediation Maintained 
Despite twenty-four comments to the contrary, the Commission 
decided to continue requiring the intermediation of a registered 
broker-dealer to address concerns regarding financial responsibility 
and the effective enforcement of U.S. securities laws.123 The regis-
tered broker-dealer, however, is not required to implement proce-
dures to obtain positive assurance that the foreign broker-dealer was 
operating in accordance with U.S. requirements. 124 Moreover, the 
intermediary does not need to be affiliated with a foreign broker-
dealer through ownership or contro1. 125 Since a nonresident regis-
tered broker-dealer was eligible to serve as intermediary under the 
Rule, the Commission reasoned that costs incurred by a foreign 
broker-dealer in complying with the Rule 15a-6(a) (3) direct contact 
exemption could be reduced.126 
The Commission indicated, however, that the registered broker-
dealer, in effecting trades arranged by the foreign broker-dealer, 
has a responsibility to review these trades for indications of possible 
violations of the federal securities laws. 127 The registered broker-
dealer's intermediation in these trades is intended to help protect 
U.S. investors and securities markets. The Commission concluded 
that a registered broker-dealer would have an obligation, as it has 
for all customer accounts, to review any Rule 15a-6 account for indi-
cations of potential problems.128 
In addition to the above responsibility, the Commission stated: 
[I]f the registered broker-dealer ignores indications of ir-
regularity that should alert the registere~ broker-dealer to 
the likelihood that the foreign broker-dealer is taking ad-
vantage of U.S. customers or otherwise violating U.S. securi-
ties laws, and the registered broker-dealer nevertheless con-
tinues to effect questionable transactions on behalf of the 
foreign broker-dealer or its customers, the registered bro-
123. See Exchange Act Release, supra note 44, at 30,024-25. 
124. See id. at 30,025. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. An unregistered U.S. bank is not eligible to serve the intermediary 
function, since a bank "would not be subject to the Commission's extensive 
statutory authority to regulate, examine, and discipline registered broker-
dealers." Id. at 30,026. 
127. See id. at 30,025. 
128. See id. 
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ker-dealer's role in the trades may give rise to possible viola-
tions of the federal securities laws.129 
This discussion of the registered broker's responsibilities vis-a-vis the 
foreign broker and its representatives begs the question of what ac-
tions must occur for a transaction to be "effected through" the reg-
istered broker. 
B. ''Effected Through" Requirement 
The requirement that transactions must be "effected through" 
the U.S. intermediary broker-dealer is not elaborated upon in the 
proposing or adopting releases. Therefore, what actions are suffi-
cient to constitute "effecting through" have been less than clear. 
This issue was addressed in a 1998 Notice to Members 
("NTM") from NASD Regulation Inc. ("NASDR") .130 Rule 
2860(6) (3) imposes a limit on the number of equity options con-
tracts in a class of stock options on the same side of the market 
(long calls plus short puts, or long puts plus short calls)131 that can 
be written by a member or an associated person. 132 NTM 98-92 
. asked whether the Rule 2860 (6) (3) limits apply to options transac-
tions intermediated by U.S. broker-dealers pursuant to Rule 15a-
6(a) (3).133 
NASDR indicated some members take the position that since 
options transactions are "intermediated" but are not carried on the 
U.S. member firm's books, for capital purposes, the transactions are 
not covered by Rule 2860(b)(3).134 NASDR disagreed. In finding 
that the Rule applied, NASDR stated that even though the option 
position was maintained by the foreign affiliate, the transaction was 
"effected" by the U.S. member within the meaning of Rule 15a-
6(a) (3).135 In stating its rationale, NASDR argued that its position 
was consistent with the purpose of Rule 2860(b)(3), and noted that 
since the U.S. member must record the affiliate's transactions, "the 
129. Id. at 30,026 (citing Merrill Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 19,070, 26 SEC 
Docket 254 (dated Sept. 21, 1982». 
130. See NASD REGULATION INC., 1998 Notice to Members 98-92 (Nov. 1998). 
131. A "put" is an option to sell a specified amount of a commodity at a fixed 
price at or within a given time. A "call" is an option to buy a certain amount 
of a commodity at a fixed price at or within a given time. See MERRlAM-
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 162, 195 (10th ed. 1995). 
132. See NASD Conduct Rule 2860 (1999). 
133. See NASD Conduct Rule 221O(d)(2) (A). 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
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member has the practical ability to enforce compliance."136 
The position taken by the NASDR seems to imply that it has 
adopted an expansive view of what actions of the U.S. intermediary 
are sufficient for a transaction to be deemed to have been "effected 
through" that firm. This at least raises the question of whether the 
NASDR would be similarly expansive in a situation where it was not 
trying to reach a desired regulatory outcome. 
However, further support for a liberal reading of the "effected 
through" requirement can be found in several no-action positions 
of the Commission. For example, a core element of "effecting 
through" is the maintenance by the U.S. intermediary broker-dealer 
of the books and records relating to the covered transactions. The 
Commissron has gone so far as to determine that an arrangement 
would be permissible where the information for such books and 
records is generated by the foreign broker-dealer and then transmit-
ted electronically to an automated matching system that is under 
the joint control of the foreign broker-dealer and the registered 
U.S. intermediary.137 
In this letter, the staff indicated that no enforcement action 
would be taken where the foreign broker made all records of the 
clearing and settlement of transactions that resulted from buy/sell 
matches made by the automated system and were executed by the 
foreign broker.138 The records would be shared electronically with 
the U.S. intermediary broker, and the parties requesting the no-
action position represented that the U.S. broker would remain re-
sponsible for the accuracy of the records published, as well as the 
prompt delivery of those records to the Commission or other exam-
ining authorityY9 
The basis for the staff's position in Investment Technology Group, 
Inc. appears to have been that the imposition of dual record keep-
136. Id. 
137. See Investment Technology Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 1011, *4 (Oct. 6, 1993). The Commission allowed an arrangement 
whereby Jefferies International Limited, an unregistered foreign broker-
dealer, executed trades then transmitted the records to Global Portfolio Sys-
tem for Institutional Trading. See id. at *4-5. Global, an automated system that 
matches purchasers to sellers of non-U.S. securities, was operated by Invest-
ment Technology Group, a wholly owned subsidiary of Jefferies Group, Inc. 
that is a registered broker-dealer. See id. at *1-2. Both Investment Technology 
Group and Jefferies International Limited controlled Global's computer sys-
tem. See id. at *4. 
138. See id. at *4-5. 
139. See id. 
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ing requirements - i.e., on both the domestic and the foreign bro-
kerage entities - is not only inefficient, but also increases the risk of 
operational error. l40 It is also implicit in the staff's conclusion that 
advances in electronic communications make it irrelevant where 
certain functions, such as record keeping, take place, so long as the 
regulatory intent - availability of records - is served.141 
This reasoning would explain a similar position taken in 1996. 
In a letter to Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., the staff reached a num-
ber of conclusions that are important to understanding the current 
state of Rule 15a-6.142 In its application, Morgan Stanley represented 
that as a U.S. broker-dealer, it is prohibited from holding funds and 
securities in India on behalf of U.S. customers.143 To address this re-
striction, M;organ Stanley proposed to have transactions in Indian 
securities for U.S. customers executed by Morgan Stanley's Indian 
affiliate, Morgan Stanley India ("MSI") and settled through the cus-
tomer's custodian. l44 Although trade orders were to be placed with 
Morgan Stanley representatives, the order would not be entered 
into or processed on Morgan Stanley's books and records. Trades 
would be entered only onto the MSI system, by MSI employees.145 
Morgan Stanley argued that dual trade entry and reconciliation 
of dual sets of books would entail substantial additional costs. The 
application acknowledges that the recordkeeping and retention re-
quirements under Exchange Act Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4146 would not 
be met, and the trades executed through the foreign affiliate would 
not be taken into account for purposes of Morgan Stanley's compli-
ance with Exchange Act Rules 17a-5147 and 17a-13.148 Moreover, the 
140. The efficiency and accuracy factors also contributed to the staff decision in In-
ternational operations Association Securities Industry Association. See infra notes 162-
69 and accompanying text. 
141. See Investment Technology Group, Inc., supra note 137. 
142. -See Morgan Stanley India Securities Pvt. Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC 
No-Act. LEXIS 975 (Dec. 20, 1996). 
143. See id. at *2. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. at *3-4. 
146. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3, -4 (1999) (requiring brokers registered pursuant to 
the Exchange Act to record all daily transactions and the individual accounts 
which may be effected, and further requires these records to be preserved for 
at least three years). 
147. See id. § 240.17a-5 (requiring brokers registered pursuant to the Exchange Act 
to periodically file customer account transactions with the Commission's of-
fice). 
148. See id. § 240.17a-13 (requiring brokers registered pursuant to the Exchange 
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confirmation delivered to V.S. customers on each transaction would 
be "combined in whole or in part with the confirmation provided 
by MSISL, but [it] will describe as appropriate the role of [Morgan 
Stanley] as agent .... "149 
Nonetheless, the staff concluded that it would not recommend 
enforcement action under the circumstances.150 A key to this deci-
sion was that through the linked computer systems of Morgan Stan-
ley and MSI, "the trade records entered onto MSISL records will be-
come available to [Morgan Stanley], as soon as they are entered, on the 
same basis as if the trades had been entered directly onto [Morgan 
Stanley'S] records. "151 
Certainly, there were other factors that the staff considered in 
arriving at its conclusion: (1) that the trades would be effected on a 
"delivery versus payment" basis; (2) that Morgan Stanley- would take 
charges for failed trades in accordance with Rule 15c3-1; (3) that it 
would comply with reserve formula requirements, even though Mor-
gan Stanley would not receive, deliver or hold the subject funds or 
securities; and (4) that it would reconcile trade tickets written by its 
representatives against trades entered on MSI's books. 152 But the 
condition precedent for this arrangement, and seemingly the sine 
qua non for the staff's acceptance, was the existence of a network 
that permitted real time transmission and sharing of trade data 
across international boundaries and time zones.153 
In sum, the "effected through" requirement has become less 
meaningful as electronic communications have improved. While the 
requirement itself may have some validity, the nominal indicia are 
in many respects outmoded. There should be flexibility in what ac-
tions will satisfy this requirement. 
C. Rule 15c3-3 Custody and Reserve Requirements 
Among the requirements of paragraph (a) (3) (iii) of Rule 15a-6 
is that the registered V.S. broker-dealer comply with Rule 15c3-3.154 
Rule 15c3-3, under the Exchange Act, requires that a broker-dealer 
maintain physical possession or control of all fully-paid and excess 
Act to file quarterly reports accounting for all securiti~s transacted under 
their control). 
149. Morgan Stanley, supra note 142, at *17. 
150. See id. at *4. 
151. ld. at *4 (emphasis added). 
152. See id. at *3-6. 
153. See id. at *3-8. 
154. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15a-6 (a) (3) (iii) (A)(6) (1999). 
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margin securities carried for the customer's account.155 Rule 15c3-3 
further requires the broker-dealer to make deposits to a reserve ac-
count based upon the amount of customer funds obtained by the 
firm, less the amount of funds extended to, or on behalf of, the 
customer.156 
A no-action letter issued subsequent to the Rule 15a-6 Adopting 
Release demonstrates how technological advances have rendered 
moot certain assumptions made under the Rule, particularly with 
respect to the control and reserve requirements. In a letter issued 
to RMK International Securities, Inc., the staff reviewed an applica-
tion by a U.S. broker to act as an agent for U.S. customers who 
wished to purchase or sell German securities.157 
RMK, the U.S. broker, represented that it would maintain a 
cash account and a securities account at ADCA Bank in Frankfurt.15s 
When RMK received a purchase order, RMK would forward the or-
der to a foreign broker for execution.159 The foreign firm would 
purchase securities for its own account as principal, and sell 
through RMK as an agent for the U.S. customer. l60 The customer 
would pay for the securities by transferring deutsche marks to the 
ADCA Bank account, or by instructing its custodian to transfer 
funds to the account in exchange for delivery of the securities.161 
Upon receipt of the customer's funds and occurrence of the settle-
ment date,162 the acquired securities would be credited to the ADCA 
account, and transferred by means of the Kassenverein System, an 
automated book-entry clearing system, to the customer's custodian. 
For a sale, the U.S. customer's custodian would transfer German se-
155. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15c3-3 (b) (1), (b)(4)(i)(D)(1999). 
156. See id. § 240.15c3-3(e). 
157. See RMK International Securities, SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178760, *4 
(Jan. 29, 1991). 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. See id. 
161. See id. 
162. The staff had previously examined the applicability of Rule 15c3-3 in light of 
diverse settlement periods and procedures in international securities markets. 
See International Operations Association Securities Industry Association, SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1066, *3-9 (Sept. 4, 1990). The 
staff found, among other things, that broker-dealers could treat the settlement 
date of foreign issued and settled securities according to the customary settle-
ment cycle in a particular country. See id. at *7. In addition, in certain coun-
tries with highly developed markets, failed trades could be determined and 
aged based upon that customary date. See id. at *8. 
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cuntles sold through the Kassenverein System to the ADCA ac-
count. 163 Upon receipt of the securities by ADCA Bank, the sales 
proceeds would be credited to the ADCA account and tp.e securities 
transferred to the purchaser. 
In assessing whether to enforce Rule 15c3-3, the staff noted the 
applicant's representations that settlement of transactions in the 
ADCA account occurred simultaneously, so that customer funds or 
securities would not be held in the account. Other than transfers 
into the account immediately prior to settlement, customer funds or 
securities would be held in the account only because of an error, or 
due to a failure to settle. l64 RMK represented that customer securi-
ties or funds held due to errors or failure to settle would be re-
turned to the customer immediately. 165 
The staff concluded that no enforcement action would be 
taken if no deposits to the 15c3-3 Special Reserve Account were 
made, and if physical possession or control were not obtained.166 
The staff's finding once again hinged on the existence of electronic 
communications that would allow for simultaneous settlement of 
transactions through the foreign bank account, and the ability of 
the U.S. broker to immediately return funds or securities held due to 
errors or fails, coupled with the U.S. broker's representation that it 
could not independently cause funds or securities to be moved out 
of its customers' custodial accounts.167 
While not a focus of the staff's response, certain of the incom-
ing correspondence from RMK had noted that other clearing sys-
tems besides Kassenverein, namely Euroclear and CEDEL (via a 
"bridge" from Euroclear) might be used. 168 Also, in what perhaps 
foreshadowed a later 15a-6 interpretation by the staff, the applicant 
affirmed that all of its U.S. clients would be Qualified Institutional 
Buyers ("QIBs") as defined in Rule 144A.169 
D. Expansion of Permissible Contacts 
A no-action letter issued shortly after the Morgan Stanley India 
letter170 re-affinned several of the positions taken in that letter, and 
163. See RMK International Securities, supra note 157, at *2. 
164. See id. at *5. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. at *1. 
169. See id. 
170. See supra notes 142-53 and accompanying text. 
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also established some important new guidelines for compliance with 
Rule 15a-6 requirements. The letter was issued to the law firm of 
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton (Cleary Gottlieb),171 which had 
applied on behalf of a number of financial center investment 
banks.172 The application sought to: (1) expand the range of U.S. 
investors that may enter into transactions with U.S.-affiliated for-
eign broker-dealers; (2) permit the direct transfer of funds and se-
curities from U.S. investors to such foreign broker-dealers; (3) ex-
pand the permitted oral and in-person contacts by such foreign 
broker-dealers; and (4) clarify that providing quotation systems that 
supply price and trading information from foreign broker-dealers 
would not constitute an impermissible contact under the rule.173 In 
presenting its case, Cleary Gottlieb noted that institutional investors 
now consider a "global approach" to be essential, and that the 
force that both drives and facilitates this approach is the "wide-
spread availability of computer-based and related communicated 
technologies. "174 
With regard to the range of U.S. investors covered by the Rule, 
the applicant noted that the definitions of "U.S. institutional inves-
tor" and "major U.S. institutional investor"175 omitted some signifi-
cant classes of investors, such as U.S. business corporations and 
partnerships.176 Also omitted were investment funds advised by in-
vestment managers that are exempt from registration under the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940.177 The staff acceded to the applicant's 
request that U.S. affiliated foreign broker dealers be permitted to 
engage in transactions with any entity, including an investment ad-
viser whether or not he is registered, that owns, controls or (as to 
advisers) manages $100 million or more in financial assets. 178 In a 
17l. See Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 525 (Apr. 9, 1997). 
172. See id. at *l. The firms represented were: Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc.; Credit 
Suisse First Boston Corporation; CSFP Capital, Inc.; Goldman Sachs & Co.; 
Lehman Brothers, Inc.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated; 
Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.; Salomon Brothers, Inc.; and Smith Barney, Inc. 
See id. at n.l. 
173. See id. at *20-36. 
174. Id. at *17. 
175. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240. 15a-6 (b) (4), (7) (1989). 
176. See Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 171, at *3. 
177. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-3(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). 
178. See Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 171, at *4, 14. In granting this relief, the staff 
closed, to a significant degree, the gap that had existed between the defini-
tions of "major U.S. institutional investor" in Rule 15a-6 and "qualified institu-
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follow-up letter, the staff clarified that this interpretation applied to 
the provisions of paragraph (a) (2) as well as paragraph (a) (3) and 
to all applicable provisions of Rule 15a-6 and interpretations 
thereunder.179 
While technology-driven operations of U.S. investors under-
pinned the need to expand the definition of "major U.S. institu-
tional investors," the request for relief from the customer protec-
tion provisions, requiring possession and control by the registered 
broker-dealer, is a more direct outcome of technological advances. 
In its application, Cleary Gottlieb notes that many U.S. institutions 
engage foreign custodians to hold, receive and deliver their foreign 
securities and local currencies.180 The settlement of a trade between 
a U.S. customer and its foreign counterpart is effected most effi-
ciently when the foreign broker-dealer is the sole intermediary be-
tween the parties. As explained by Cleary Gottlieb, the interposition 
of a U.S. broker-dealer would serve not only to cause a duplication 
of custodial, accounting and other settlement functions, but also 
would increase the risk of operational errors and settlement 
failures. 181 
The Commission accepted this reasoning, but subject to the 
conditions that the foreign broker-dealer must make clearance and 
settlement information available to the registered broker-dealer, 
that the foreign broker-dealer may not be in default on any mate-
rial financial market transaction, and also that the U.S. intermediary 
broker-dealer must fulfill its other obligations under Rule 15a-6.182 
The next element of the application sought to broaden the for-
eign broker-dealer's ability to contact U.S. investors personally and 
through the provision of electronic data. Under Rule 15a-6, per-
sonal contacts by the foreign broker-dealer are subject to the so-
tional buyer" (QIB) in Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933. See 17 
C.F.R. § 230. 144A. Subsection (a) (1) (H) of Rule 144A had already included 
corporations, partnerships, and business trusts as "QIBs." See id. § 
230.144A(a) (i) (I)(H). See also id. § 230. 144A(a) (i)-(iv) (giving other examples 
of QIBs). This appears to have provided a further rationale for the staff's po-
sition. 
179. See Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 573 (Apr. 28, 1997). 
180. See Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 171, at *25. 
181. See id. at *24-25. 
182. See id. at *14-15. Neither the Cleary Gottlieb application nor the staff's re-
sponse focuses on the paragraph (a) (3) responsibility of the registered broker 
for delivery of confirmations and statements, as well as other books and 
records requirements. 
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called "chaperoning" requirements.183 These requirements include 
limitations on both phone contacts and in-person visits by the for-
eign broker-dealers, unless a representative of the registered broker-
dealer is present.184 
In accepting the arguments set forth by Cleary Gottlieb, the 
staff agreed to loosen the strictures of Rule 15a-6 so that foreign 
representatives, without the intermediation of the U.S. broker-
dealer, could: (1) engage in oral communications from abroad with 
U.S. institutional investors where communications take place outside 
the trading hours of the New York Stock Exchange,185 so long as the 
unregistered foreign broker-dealer accepts orders only for foreign 
securities; and (2) have in-person contacts in the United States with 
major U.S. institutional investors, so long as the number of days on 
which in-person contacts occur does not exceed 30 per year and the 
foreign representatives do not accept orders while in the United 
States.186 
The other relief relating to contacts with U.S. investors was the 
request to relax the Commission's stance on provision of quotation 
systems. In the Adopting Release, the Commission stated that it 
would permit the distribution of third party quotation systems to 
U.S. investors where the quotations transmitted over such systems 
were delivered "primarily in foreign countries. "187 In addition, pro-
prietary quotation systems - where the U.S. investors could place a 
trade through the foreign broker/market maker providing the quo-
tations - were viewed by the Commission as an impermissible in-
ducement to trade with that foreign broker-dealer.l88 
The applicant noted that since quotation systems had become 
more global through a variety of technological improvements since 
adoption of Rule 15a-6, it was no longer practicable to distinguish a 
system by whether its quotation data was delivered "primarily in for-
eign countries. "189 As to proprietary systems, while acknowledging 
183. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a)(3)(iii) (1999); see also supra notes 1O(}.Q8 and ac-
companying text. 
184. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15a-6(a) (3)(ii) (A) (l),(iii) (B) (1999). 
185. See Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 171, at *9-10. Also, while the application deals 
with specifics of oral and in-person communications, it is unclear howe-mail 
would be treated. See id. 
186. See id. at *9-10, 14. 
187. Requirements for Foreign Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 27,017, 
54 Fed. Reg. 30,013, 30,018 (July 18, 1989). 
188. See id. at 30,019. 
189. Cleary Gottlieb, supra note 171, *32. 
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that trades placed by the U.S. investor might be viewed as solicited 
and therefore outside the Rule 15a-6(a)(1) exemption for unsolic-
ited trades, the applicant observed that quotations were already per-
mitted to be delivered orally.1OO Cleary Gottlieb summed up its argu-
ment by stating that "the availability of improved technologies for 
providing investors with quotations should not be restricted merely 
because it is impossible to 'chaperone' a data transmission."191 
As with the other relief requested, the staff accepted these posi-
tions. Notably, the staff expressly made the no-action relief applica-
ble not only to Cleary Gottlieb and its clients, but also to all simi-
larly situated U.S. registered broker-dealers and foreign affiliate 
broker-dealers.192 
Taken in isolation, the Cleary Gottlieb letters might appear to 
be a watershed event in the interpretation of Rule 15a-6. However, 
the positions taken by the staff in those letters are consistent with 
earlier decisions. Subsequent decisions have continued to vitiate the 
restrictiveness of the Rule as improvements in communications tech-
nology link the world's financial markets ever more closely together. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The globalization of the securities industry has continued to ac-
celerate since the adoption of Rule 15a-6. Competition between U.S. 
firms and foreign securities firms has become intense as each seeks 
to become a one-stop provider of a comprehensive and cost-
effective range of financial products and related services for their 
customers. These firms are anxious to engage in cross-border trans-
actions in an effort to either maintain or create equal access to the 
marketplace. Institutional investors recognize that their investment 
strategies must reflect the significance of proper diversification and 
a global approach to investing. Even some" retail investors have 
demonstrated considerable interest in purchasing foreign securities 
as they go public. They too recognize that companies around the 
globe are capable of impacting their domestic economy. 
Much of the marketplace competition has been fueled by tech-
nological and communications advances, as well as industry deregu-
lation. The Internet and ECNs are already bridging the gap be-
tween buyers and sellers of securities, effectively diminishing the 
need for an intermediary broker. For institutions, clearing systems, 
190. See ill. at *34. 
191. [d. 
192. See ill. at *14. 
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such as DTC, Kassenverein, Crest and Euroclear (to name a few), 
make real-time global communication and transactions a reality.193 
The advances have spurred market activity to reach all-time highs. 
All of which brings us to our original question: if U.S. securities 
laws and regulations are designed to establish and promote markets 
that are fair and efficient, then-in a world where national bounda-
ries have become secondary to market imperatives-has Rule 15a-6 
outlived its usefulness? Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, stated "if barriers to competi-
tion did not exist, then neither would the need, in many respects, 
for regulatory involvement. "194 This statement may be apropos of 
Rule 15a-6. 
193. See supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text. 
194. September 23, 1999 speech delivered at Columbia Law School as reported by 
the Wall Street Journal. 
